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Abstract
This paper is differentiated from most previous studies in that it uses intra-ASEAN’s (of the 5
founding counties) historical data and it assesses both exports and the export-GDP nexus by
isolating the following three different historical policy interventions: the introduction of
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 1977, the unilateral liberalisation following the
severe recession of the mid-1980s and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) formation in
1992. Our findings indicate that the ASEAN-5 countries’ economies are moving together
through time and emerged as a powerful integrated area as a consequence of all of the above
three interventions. Unilateral liberalisation and ASEAN regionalism are complementary
with each other. The ASEAN’s story is unique and relies on both outward orientation and
positive aspects of regionalism.
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1. Trade liberalisation in the ASEAN-5 countries
Five countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, formed the
ASEAN-5 group in 1967 to promote cooperation in economic, social and cultural areas and
to promote regional peace and stability. 1 Since then, three different economic policy
interventions have heavily influenced the integration of the ASEAN-5. First the Bali Summit
in 1976 adopted preferential tariff agreements (PTAs) which represented the first major
commitment on the part of member countries towards a joint effort to liberalise intra-ASEAN
trade (Imada, 1993). Second, unilateral liberalisation measures taken by the ASEAN-5
countries outside the ASEAN framework promoted intra-ASEAN trade flows in the second
half of the 1980s (Ariff, 1994; Tan, 2004). Finally, to enhance the economic benefits of the
region, the ASEAN initiated the Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in
Singapore in January 1992 which laid out a comprehensive programme of regional tariff
reduction, to be completed in stages through to 2008.

Bali Summit in 1976
In February 1976, the Bali Summit adopted PTAs. The ASEAN-5 foreign ministers signed
this agreement in 1977. The PTAs outlined a mechanism whereby the ASEAN-5 countries
could liberalise trade at a pace that was acceptable to all member countries. Initially, 71 items
were selected with a voluntary product-by-product approach under the PTAs. By June 1986,
the PTAs covered 12,647 items using a more efficient across-the-board approach. There has
been some concern that the ASEAN-5 countries were unable to reach stable agreements in
terms of items under the PTA in order to enhance economic benefits associated with trade
creation. By producing the same types of commodities and depending on wider markets
outside the region, the ASEAN-5 nations were reluctant to give up their own benefits at the
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bargaining table. However, it is quite clear that intra-ASEAN trade share has increased to
some extent as a share of global trade due to PTAs (Imada, 1993; see also our results).

Unilateral liberalisation in the second half of the 1980s
Following the severe recession of the mid-1980s, and the steady fall in the price of oil,
important policy reforms have been initiated by the ASEAN-5 countries at their own pace
(Tan, 2004). The extent of reforms varies between these countries and over time but trade
liberalisation as the bottom-line of all reform exercises remained the same. These reforms
occurred in trade, finance, tax and foreign direct investment during the second half of the
1980s. Deregulation has been an important component in the reform agenda. Thus measures
taken by the ASEAN member countries reduced the inefficiencies and transaction costs in the
system and accelerated economic growth which in turn resulted in ‘innovative and bold
regional experiments’ (Ariff, 1994).

The advantage of similar cultural values, low wages and strong fundamentals promoted
export oriented investments and exports among the ASEAN-5 countries. The bulk of foreign
investment was involved with export-oriented activities. In brief, the ASEAN member
countries were integrated more than ever partly due to regional economic cooperation
initiated by them and partly due to anonymous market forces initiated by globally oriented
policy. Evidence shows that the unilateral liberalisation taken by the ASEAN-5 countries
outside the ASEAN framework in the late 1980s united the ASEAN members in economic
cooperation and contributed to increased intra-ASEAN trade flows (Imada, 1993: Ariff,
1994: Kettunen, 1998).
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The AFTA formation
The ASEAN group has learned with its own experience to reap the positive effects of
economic regionalism without facing any negative consequences associated with preferential
measures. The ASEAN’s current activities promoted a positive side of regionalism without
ignoring the potential benefits that arise from ‘outward orientation’. To reap the potential
economic benefits from the region, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) was formed in 1992.2
The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Agreement, which was agreed upon under
the AFTA, 3 identified commodities (the inclusion list) that were traded within the ASEAN
region and were ready for tariff reduction, thus meeting the 40 per cent ASEAN’s content
requirement. These commodities were subject to reducing tariffs to 0-5 per cent by the year
2002/2003. The CEPT recognises that tariff reductions should move ahead on both the "fast"
and "normal" tracks. Tariffs on goods in the fast track met the reduction of tariffs requirement
by 2000 and the normal track by 2003. About 81 per cent of tariff lines within the ASEAN
countries are covered by either the fast or normal track. It was expected to cover nearly 98
per cent of all tariff lines by 2003.4

Commodities that are not ready for tariff reductions are put under the temporary exclusion
list. Tariffs on these commodities will ultimately be as well lowered to 0-5 per cent. Also
sensitive commodities will not be subject to tariff reductions until 2010. Finally about 1 per
cent of tariff lines fall into general exceptions for items related to national security, public
morals, protection of artistic, historic and archaeological value. The average CEPT tariff rate
in the inclusion list has been reduced from 12.76 per cent in 1993 to 2.68 per cent in 2003
(US-ASEAN Business Council, 2004).
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After 1992, agreements were also reached for intra-ASEAN investment, non-tariff barriers,
services, intellectual property, customs and tourism. However, a few studies indicate that the
ASEAN integration can still be considered as an unfinished agenda (for example, see Menon,
1998). There is a tendency that some members are either more inward-looking in the wake of
Asian crisis or are pursuing their own programmes of liberalisation. For example, Malaysia
delayed the tariff reduction programme for its automotive industry until 2005 which was
originally expected to be included as of 1 January 2000 in the inclusion list (Mahani, 2002).

2. Literature review and the aims of the present study
Low (2003) surveyed some empirical studies on the ASEAN group and concluded that
measurement of the economic impact of the ASEAN regionalism is in its infancy. Our own
survey (see also Jayanthakumaran, 2004, for a comprehensive review on trade liberalization
and its measurement) also shows that it is in the measurement problem that empirical studies
differ from each other. Inconsistency in time spans, focus of countries and methodology
constitute a barrier against a meaningful comparison. The general findings of various studies
indicate some positive performance due to integration. As a preliminary trend we can
mention that the intra-ASEAN-5 trade share in relation to overall world trade has increased
from 12.7 per cent in 1975 to 21 per cent in 2003. The above share was about 17.9 per cent in
1993. Among the ASEAN-5 countries, Thailand and the Philippines have increased their
trade share (in relation to overall world trade) over time while the others maintained their
existing shares. Hurley (2003) found that the intra-industry trade among the ASEAN-5 has
been increased from 35 per cent in 1987 to about 60 per cent in 1996. Hurley incorporated
bilateral foreign direct investment and found a substantial increase in vertical and horizontal
intra-industry trade in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, while promoting only vertical intraindustry trade in Singapore. The overall results show that the importance of intra-ASEAN
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investment in promoting the region’s export sector in both vertically and horizontally
differentiated goods has been remarkable. 5

A number of empirical studies focused on the ASEAN trade in relation to global trade rather
than intra-ASEAN trade and obtained mixed results. Tang (2004) investigated the long-run
relationship of the aggregate import demand function for the ASEAN-5 countries covering
annual observations of global imports from 1960 to 1999. The results based on the bounds
test show that the behaviour of import demand in Malaysia and Singapore does form a
cointegrating relation but not in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Baharumshah, Lau
and Fountas (2003) examined the sustainability of the global current account imbalance for
the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) over the period
1961 to 1999. These authors identified two prominent structural shifts over the period and
related them with the global price shocks of 1973-75 and commodity crisis of 1985.

Adams and Park (1995), by using a general equilibrium model6, forecast that the ASEAN
group would be better off from its integration (AFTA) and the trade volume within the
ASEAN would increase. Sharma and Chua (2000) estimated a gravity model7 for each one of
the ASEAN-5 nations based on data from 1980 to 1995 and concluded that the intra-ASEAN
trade did not increase but trade with the wider Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
group did increase. Elliot and Ikemoto (2004) used a gravity equation8 to evaluate the
ASEAN intra- and extra-regional bias in bilateral trade flows during the period 1982 to 1999,
and concluded that trade flows were not significantly affected in the years immediately after
the implementation of the AFTA agreement and also that the traditional stand of ASEAN
countries to outward-oriented economic activity has not significantly changed.
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The studies that used data up to 1992 also show some mixed results. Ahmad and Harnhirun
(1995) estimated the long-run behavioural relationship between exports of ASEAN countries
globally and economic growth of the ASEAN countries for the years 1966 to 1990 and
concluded that an export-GDP connection exists in Singapore but not in the other ASEAN
member countries. 9 Imada (1993) examined how a closer integration would change patterns
of exports, production and consumption by identifying the demand and supply side
elasticities prior to 1992. The results of the disaggregated industry level analysis indicated
that the intra-ASEAN trade would expand if intraregional trade is liberalised, partially or
completely (ibid).

In the present paper, we establish that both unilateral liberalisation and the ASEAN
integration (both through PTAs and the AFTA) are by nature complementary and help
promoting trade flows and income among the ASEAN-5 countries. Our study is differentiated
from most of other previous studies in that it uses intra-ASEAN-5 data and it assesses both
exports,10 and the export-GDP nexus by employing econometric analysis that isolates the
impact of trade liberalisation on the ASEAN integration at the following cut off years: the
introduction of PTAs in 1977, the unilateral liberalisation in the second half of the1980s
(hence we have chosen 1987 as the mid point of the second half of the 1980s to represent our
cut-off year) and the AFTA formation in 1992.

Unlike previous studies on ASEAN, which examined global trade of the ASEAN group, this
paper strictly investigates the impact on intra-ASEAN-5 trade and GDP growth. Our paper is
a comprehensive analysis focusing on the impact of all the above three policy interventions
on exports, and the export-GDP nexus. A recent survey shows that this nexus exists (Lewer
and Van den Berg, 2003). The contribution of the present paper sheds light on individual
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country benefits from these main three trade liberalisation interventions in terms of greater
exports and income. Also, due emphasis is given to Singapore’s economy which is closely
linked with the region through trade (Tang, 2004: Ahmed and Tongzon, 1998).

3. Empirical analysis
Exports data for the intra-ASEAN 5 countries are from the Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS) yearbook published by the United Nations, while real GDP figures are collected
from the DX Database, and the World Bank World Tables 2003.

Exports analysis
Figure 1 shows the exports in terms of US$ for the 5 founding ASEAN countries. It is
apparent in this graph that these major partners seem to have experienced a relative boost in
their exports after the 3 following approximate dates: 1977, 1987, and 1993 (as explained
above).11 Out of these three ‘structural changes’ the last one seems to have been the strongest.
Around the year 1998 the Asian financial crisis is also apparent with a sudden drop in 1998
and further disturbances around that year.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

In Figure 1 it is also apparent that Singapore and Malaysia are the most important exporting
countries. Singapore as a commercial hub seems to ‘dictate’ the pattern of exports. Hence an
examination of this country’s exports as a pilot case should be illuminating. In addition, as
will be shown below, all five countries are cointegrated in terms of their exports. Overall, we
propose the following sequence in our quantitative analysis. First, Singapore’s exports will be
fully examined according to the broad directions set by Enders (1995) (see also Mehanna and
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Shamsub, 2002, for an example of application of these directions on the North American Free
Trade Agreement –NAFTA- group of countries) regarding intervention analysis. Second, we
will briefly show that the five countries are cointegrated in terms of their exports, or put it
more simply, they seem to move in the same way through time and in particular they have the
same timing regarding the impact of the five governments’ three main policy changes to
liberalize and integrate their countries. Third, the best model chosen for Singapore will also
be applied to the other four countries and adjusted if necessary to their special nature.

Hence starting with Singapore exports, we first checked their order of integration in order to
determine an optimal ARIMA model. The ADF test on Singapore exports, dsingapore
exports (first differences of Singapore exports) and ddsingapore exports (second differences
in Singapore exports) indicate that Singapore exports are integrated of order one. This test
was conducted for the period from 1967 to 1992 (the year before the AFTA formation, hence
1967 to 1992 is the largest period out of the two sub-periods, the other one being 1993 to
2003). The second step was to determine the best model of dsingapore export (expressing the
first order integration) in terms of the order of autoregression and error moving average
(Enders, 1995; Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). According to the maximum value of the
information criteria of Akaike and Schwarz we arrived at the optimum12 model (period
examined 1967 to 1992) of ARIMA (3, 1, 1).

The third step was to include the intervention variable in order to test for the significance of
this variable and also to confirm whether or not the ARIMA(3, 1, 1) model is also significant
for the whole period (1967 to 2003) together with the intervention variable 13. With the
inclusion of the latter in the chosen model, some variables became insignificant. Hence a new
model was searched and the final ARIMA model was chosen to be ARIMA (2, 1, 0). The
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results of this OLS regression14 (model M1) are shown in Table 1 where it is seen that a
dummy variable dum4 with the value of one for the year 1998 was also included in order to
take into account the Asian financial crisis15. The coefficients of all three variables are very
significant and have the right sign. In particular the intervention variable dum1 (0 from 1967
to 1992 and 1 from 1993 to 2003) shows that since 1993 integration became stronger because
exports have increased by about 2.7 billion US$ per year.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

The fourth step was to further improve the model M1 by using the Cochrane-Orcutt approach
to error autocorrelation16. The results are shown in Table 1 as model M2. The superiority of
M2 over M1 lies in two factors: first all the test statistics of M2 are better than those of M1
(e.g. the R2); second an examination of the histogram of residuals in M2 shows an
improvement over that of M1, in terms of normality, thus further confirming the validity of
model M2. As a side effect of M2 the dum1 shows that since 1993 exports have increased by
about 3.4 billion US$ (much higher than for the OLS method). The fifth step was to extend
the intervention variable to include the second and third interventions (as mentioned above)
in 1987 and 1978 respectively. The same model as determined up to the fourth step was
applied subsequently with the inclusion of the two extended intervention dates and the results
are shown in Table 1. When the intervention of 1987 is included, models M3 and M4 show
the results (the dum5 variable takes the values 0 from 1967 to 1986, 1 from 1987 to 1992, and
2 from 1993 to 2003). When the intervention of 1978 is included, models M5 and M6 show
the results (the dum7 variable takes the values 0 from 1967 to 1977, 1 from 1978 to 1986, 2
from 1987 to 1992, and 4 from 1993 to 2003). All these models are consistent in their
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performance in terms of the significance of all17 variables included and the appropriate
diagnostic tests.18 The main conclusion is that all three interventions are very significant.

The next major stage is to briefly show that the five countries’ exports are moving together
through time thus exhibiting the same reactions to the three major interventions regarding
trade liberalization and integration (see above). The Johansen’s cointegration approach was
therefore applied to the five exports series and the results are shown in Table 2 (only the first
and strongest cointegrating vector19 is shown together with the corresponding standard errors
of the coefficients). Both the level and first differences are examined because the ADF tests
were inconclusive as to whether all five level export variables are integrated of order one or
two20. Both cointegrating vectors (that of levels and that of first differences) are found to be
highly significant (very small standard errors). To support these results, cointegrating vectors
for four pairs (the first differences dsingapore exports against the other four nations’ exports
in first differences) are also estimated (not shown here) which led to similar conclusions 21.
Furthermore for the other pairs such as dmalaysia exports as a function of dthailand exports,
or dthailand exports as a function of dphilippines exports, and so on, OLS regressions or
Cochrane-Orcutt estimations once more confirm our conclusions that exports are moving
together through time and react in a similar way to all three trade policy interventions.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Consequently we will now apply the same model found in the first stage about Singapore to
the other four nations (the intervention variable dum7 contains all three interventions for
1978, 1987, and 1993). The results are shown in Table 3. All countries show a strong impact
of the trade liberalization and integration interventions on their exports performance: exports
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have approximately doubled after each intervention (since the intervention variable has the
values 0, 1, 2, and 4 for the four periods 1967-77, 1978-86, 1987-92, and 1993-03
respectively).

[Insert Table 3 about here]

GDP analysis
Figure 2 shows the five series of national GDP. A different to exports analysis for the five
countries’ GDP will now be carried out in order to further confirm the impact of the three
main interventions on this macro variable and hence on trade liberalization and integration.
This analysis will be based on the close relationship between GDP growth and exports (on
this relationship see for example a recent survey by Lewer and Van den Berg, 2003). In
general we expect that GDP changes are dependent on export changes in a positive way. This
is especially true among the trade dependent countries. In addition we expect that the
intervention variable dum7 will also have a direct positive effect on GDP as trade
liberalisation reflects export oriented trade and investment among the regional partners. Table
4 summarizes the results for the five countries (small differences in the model structure are
necessary to take into account the peculiarities of each country as explained below).

[Insert Figure 2 about here)

It is evident from these results that GDP growth depends on intra-ASEAN exports (the
poorest performance is for the Philippine GDP). Also, GDP growth depends on the trade
interventions 22 as captured by the dummy variable dum7 (and dum6 for Thailand: 0 for 1967
to 1977, 1 from 1978 to 1986, 2 from 1987 to 1992, and 3 from 1993 to 200323). The
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financial Asian crisis of 1998 has significantly affected Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and
Philippines but not Singapore.

The integration of the five founding countries can be further confirmed by some basic
econometric tests as to their statistical cointegration. For this reason, first ADF tests gave
some convincing evidence that GDP series are cointegrated of order one although not
completely convincing that all of them are so (Malaysia could be a I(2) process, especially if
a trend is not included). In any case as we have mainly been dealing with first differences in
our models so far, both the levels and first differences of the five countries’ GDP were
subjected to the Johansen’s method of cointegration as we did for exports. The results are
shown in Table 2. It is evident from these results that effectively the five countries’
economies are cointegrated, which confirms our hypothesis that these countries have been
integrated as a strong commercial union according to our analysis in this paper.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

4. Conclusions
This paper is differentiated from most of the previous empirical literature in that it uses intraASEAN-5 countries’ historical data for the period 1967 to 2003 and it assesses both exports
and the export-GDP nexus by isolating the following three entirely different historical policy
interventions: the introduction of PTAs in 1977, the unilateral liberalisation following the
severe recession of the mid-1980s and the AFTA formation in 1992. Although evidence
indicates that the ASEAN-5 countries experienced difficulty reaching stable agreements in
terms of items under the PTAs, trade among ASEAN-5 countries increased due to PTAs. The
evidence tends to show that unilateral liberalisation measures taken by the ASEAN-5

13

countries outside the ASEAN framework promoted intra-ASEAN-5 trade flows in the second
half of 1980s and beyond. This area has not been quantitatively assessed. As some empirical
work tends to show that there is a positive impact due to the AFTA formation, the present
study has further explored this furthermore and confirmed this positive impact. Unlike
previous studies on ASEAN countries, which examined the global trade of ASEAN, this
paper strictly investigates the impact on the intra-ASEAN-5 trade and income (GDP).
Overall, this paper has shed some light on individual country benefits from the main three
trade liberalisation interventions, in terms of greater exports and income.

In summary, we started our intervention analysis with Singapore’s exports, using ARIMA
models and further improved this model by using the Cochrane-Orcutt approach to error
autocorrelation. The results show that all three interventions (expressed via dum 1, dum 5,
dum6, or dum7) are significant. The AFTA formation generated an impact as strong as the
other two policy interventions in 1977 and 1987 (Table 1). Based on Singapore’s model (with
certain adjustments) we assessed the other four countries by including all three policy
interventions (dum 6 or dum 7). All three interventions are positive and approximately
doubled exports after each intervention (Table 3). It was also found that the exports of the
four ASEAN countries (except perhaps Indonesia) are moving together through time
including the impact of all three policy interventions by using Johansen’s cointegration
approach (Table 2).

Finally, the export-GDP nexus is explored among the ASEAN-5 countries and included all
three interventions (via the dum 7 variable). We found that a strong export GDP nexus exists
among the five countries of the ASEAN group (Table 4). This indicates that the higher the
ASEAN integration is the higher the GDP growth will be. The results regarding this GDP-
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exports link allow us to be more comfortable about our overall conclusions: the three
interventions on trade liberalization and integration have had a considerable impact on the
ASEAN-5 countries’ economies (GDP related) as well as on their intra trade. The financial
crisis of 1997/98 has significantly affected the four countries of the ASEAN group but not
Singapore so much (Table 4). The continuation of implementing the CEPT agreement even
after the Asian financial crisis generated a positive impact on the ASEAN-5 group.
Furthermore, all five countries’ economies are cointegrated (the Johansen’s procedure is
again applied and the results are shown in Table 2) in terms of GDP (hence all three policy
interventions are indirectly included).

For the ASEAN-5 countries, it is proposed and quantitatively confirmed that the unilateral
liberalisation is complementary to intra-ASEAN integration. The advantage of low wages,
distance, cultural links and strong economic fundamentals reflected in increased export
oriented trade among the regional partners and generated more integration and associated
economic benefits to the region. Fortunately, the ASEAN-5 countries had the capacity and
capabilities to exploit the efficiency gains that have been generated by unilateral and nonunilateral liberalisation of member countries. We firmly believe that the ASEAN countries
shed some light in this regard (on unilateral and non-unilateral trade liberalisation and a
smooth way of integration) to the other developing world.
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Figure 1

Export series for the five countries (in US$000)

40000000

singex

35000000

dsingex
30000000

malex

25000000

thaex

20000000

indoex

15000000

philex

10000000
5000000
2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

1973

1971

1969

-5000000

1967

0

-10000000

Notes: (a) dsingex is the first differences in Singapore’s export, hence it fluctuates around zero; (b) philex
(Philippine’s export) is the lowest series on the graph; malex is Malaysia’s exports; thaex is Thailand’s
exports; indoex is Indonesia’s exports.

19

Table 1

Singapore’s exports performance (variable dsingapore export)

Variable

M1
OLS

M2
CO, AR(3)

M3
OLS

M4
CO, AR(3)

M5
OLS

M6
CO, AR(3)

dSingapore
exports (-2)

-0.386
(-2.9)

-0.61
(4.9)

-0.40
(-3.1)

-0.56
(-4.1)

-0.40
(-3.1)

-0.57
(-4.3)

dum1

2656
(3.2)

3437
(2.5)
1519
(3.6)

1798
(3.6)
851
(3.5)

1043
(3.3)

dum5
dum7
dum4

-10300
(-4.5)

-11800
(-5.8)

-10300
(-4.7)

-11900
(-5.8)

-10300
(-4.7)

-11800
(-5.7)

constant

710
(1.6)

806
(1.0)

332
(0.7)

404
(0.70)

-43
(-0.08)

-153
(-0.2)

R

0.50

0.60

0.53

0.61

0.53

0.60

DW statistic

1.6

1.8

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

Serial correlation

0.31

0.53

0.50

Functional form

0.61

0.80

0.77

Normality

0.00

0.00

0.00

Heteroscedasticity

0.46

0.45

0.45

Histogram of
residuals to check
normality

Not normal

2

Improv/nt
on M1

Not normal

Considerable
improvement
on M3

Not
normal

Considerable
improvement
on M5

Notes: (a) for the significance of models M1 to M6 see text; (b) OLS stands for ordinary least squares; CO
stands for Cochrane-Orcutt; and AR (3) stands for autoregressive residuals of order three; (c) for the diagnostic
tests, the figures in the Table indicate the probability values of rejection (as per Microfit program, Pesaran and
Pesaran, 1997); (d) the dum1 (0 from 1967 to 1992 and 1 from 1993 to 2003) expresses billions of US$; (e) for
the dum5: 0 from 1967 to 1986, 1 from 1987 to 1992 and 2 from 1993 to 2003; for the dum7: 0 from 1967 to
1977, 1 from 1978 to 1986, 2 from 1987 to 1992 and 4 from 1993 to 2003; for the dum4: 1 for 1998 and 0 for
all other years.
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Table 2

Cointegration of exports; GDP

Singapore exports
Singapore GDP
dSingapore exports
dSingapore GDP
Malaysia exports
Malaysia GDP
dMalaysia exports
dMalaysia GDP
Thailand exports
Thailand GDP
dThailand exports
dThailand GDP
Indonesia exports
Indonesia GDP
dIndonesia exports
dIndonesia GDP
Philippines exports
Philippines GDP
dPhilippines exports
dPhilippines GDP
Trend

Exports
VAR(2)
1.00

Exports
VAR(4)

GDP
VAR(1)
1.00

1.00
-0.61
(0.09)

1.00
-1.05
(0.175)

-0.85
(0.08)
-2.07
(0.16)

-2.24
(0.37)
-2.85
(1.10)

-1.05
(0.19)
-0.10
(0.07)

-2.23
(0.73)
3.89
(1.33)

-0.13
(0.05)
1.18
(0.11)

-33248
(13903)

Notes: d indicates first differences.

GDP
VAR(2)

3.54
(0.91)
0.51
(0.18)

1.06
(0.11)
-12463
(1788)

-4.67
(1.54)

0.54
(0.18)
0.16
(0.06)
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Table 3

Exports performance of the other four ASEAN countries

dMalaysia exports (-2)

CO, AR(3)
dMalaysia
exports
-0.60
(-3.5)

dThailand exports(-2)

CO, AR(3)
dThailand exports

CO, AR(2)
dIndonesia exports

-0.84
(-7.0)

dIndonesia exports (-1)

-0.60
(3.9)

dPhilippines exports (-2)
dum7
dum4

687
(4.2)
-6745
(-4.4)

373.5
(2.7)
-3637
(-6.5)

inton
constant
R2
DW statistic

CO, AR(1)
dPhillippines
exports

62
(0.2)
0.61
1.94

45
(0.1)
0.67
2.27

227
(2.0)

-2318
(-4.0)
100
(0.4)
0.43
1.86

-0.45
(2.6)
190
(4.4)
-61
(-0.2)

-112
(-1.1)
0.44
2.00

Notes: (a) d indicates first difference (b) Indonesia: the financial Asian crisis took place mainly in 1999 in this
country; hence the dummy variable ‘inton’ replaces dum4 in the relevant column for dindonesia exports. (c)
Philippines: the financial Asian crisis has not significantly affected their exports; (d) for other explanations see
notes of Table 1.
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Figure 2

GDP series for the 5 ASEAN countries
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Note: The y-axis shows GDP indexes; mal stands for Malaysia’s GDP index series, and so on.
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Table 4

Exports, GDP and trade intervention policies

dSingapore
exports
dMalaysia exports

dSingapore
GDP
C.O. AR(2)
0.00001003
(7.7)

dMalaysia
GDP
C.O. AR(1)

dIndonesia
GDP
C.O. AR(1)

dPhilippines
GDP
C.O. AR(2)

0.000008233
(6.9)

dThailand exports

0.000009632
(2.4)

dIndonesia
exports
dPhilippines
exports
dum6
dum7

dThailand
GDP
OLS

0.000005355
(2.3)
0.00001368
(1.9)
1.12
(4.0)
0.71
(2.9)
-0.60
(-0.3)

1.02
(4.2)
-11.6
(-9.1)

-13.1
(-5.8)

0.67
(2.5)
-18.0
(-17.2)

R2

1.40
(2.5)
0.74

1.29
(2.2)
0.91

1.28
(2.8)
0.77

2.00
(2.8)
0.91

0.31
(1.68)
-5.0
(-3.4)
-8.8
(-8.6)
2.6
(6.9)
0.76

DW statistic

1.76

1.98

1.59

1.93

1.1

dum4
cris
constant

Serial corr/on

0.064

0.004

Func/al form

0.361

0.506

Normality

0.000

0.251

Heteroscedasticity

0.635

0.778

Notes: (a) d indicates first difference (b) OLS stands for ordinary least squares; CO stands for Cochrane-Orcutt;
and AR (2) stands for autoregressive residuals of order two; (c) dum6 for Thailand takes the values 0 from 1967
to 1977, 1 from 1978 to 1986, 2 from 1987 to 1992, and 3 from 1993 to 2003; d) for further explanations see
notes of Table 1; e) for Philippines, the dummy variable ‘cris’ (1 for 1984 and 1985, zero otherwise - the
Philippines was the only country that was substantially affected by the mid 1980s recession) was added for
further improvement by capturing the severe recession or crisis in these two years.

24

Endnotes
1

The ASEAN-6 emerged by incorporating Brunei in 7 January 1984. The ASEAN-10
countries emerged by incorporating Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1990s. Our
research focuses on the ASEAN-5 founding nations mainly because of continuous data
availability.
2
The preparation for forming the AFTA began in 1990. The AFTA Council was formed as
an institutional arrangement which comprises Ministers from the ASEAN member States and
the Secretary-General of the ASEAN. The AFTA Council was made responsible for
supervising, coordinating and reviewing the implementation of the CEPT agreement that
covers manufacturing, processed and unprocessed agricultural commodities.
3
The new members of ASEAN - Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam - are scheduled to
reduce tariff rates to the 0-5 per cent level according to different timetables.
4
The CEPT status for ASEAN-5 in 2001 was as follows: tariff lines in the inclusion list
37391, in the temporary exclusion list 239, in the general exception list 175, and in the
sensitive list 144.
5
Fan and Dickie (2000) found a positive contribution of FDI to growth of the ASEAN-5 by
using the growth accounting method.
6
Forecast values of trade obtained from this general equilibrium model may not adequately
show the reality. For example this analysis did rely on many assumptions as usual and did not
consider the unexpected Asian crisis and its aftermath. The early forecast estimates fell short
from reality.
7
For an exposition of the gravity equation’s inherent limitations, see Evenett and Keller,
2002; Mehanna and Shamsub, 2002. The extensive use of dummy variables in the gravity
models to test the hypothesis that trading regions significantly explain trade volumes may be
mis-specifying and may lead to inaccurate interpretations and improper economic inference.
8
See previous endnote.
9
Lewer and Van den Berg (2003) re-examined the existing empirical literature on the tradegrowth nexus and concluded that a one percentage point increase in the growth of exports is
associated with a one fifth percentage point increase in economic growth.
10
The difference between exports (in FOB prices) and imports (in CIF prices) in a bilateral
trade is mainly based on the difference between FOB and CIF calculations. Hence, exports or
imports could be equally investigated. However, we chose exports as they also are a more
direct performance indicator for trade and economic reforms.
11
Exchange rates remained stable immediately or after the intervention cut-off dates of 1977,
1987 and 1992 for all the ASEAN-5 countries. Based on this we ignored the effect of these
rates in our analysis and assumed their role insignificant in determining substantial impacts
on exports and GDPs during the intervention policies.
12
Despite the maximum value of the information criteria for ARIMA(3,1,1) we suspected
that this model might not be the right one because its coefficients are not significant.
13
As Enders (1995) correctly remarks, once the intervention variable is included, the original
chosen ARIMA model should be altered if the coefficients of the related ARIMA variables
are not significant.
14
The constant was found insignificant in most models.
15
The exclusion of that variable from the model would not lead to as robust results as with its
inclusion because the Asian financial crisis created a very significant disturbance of the
export series around the 1998 year.
16
For the Cochrane-Orcutt models the order of autoregression in residuals is 3, which was
found to optimize the fitness and normality tests (higher order produced unstable processes).
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17

The variable ‘constant’ is consistently insignificant in all models examined. When this
variable was omitted from the models of Table 1, the results did not significantly improve.
18
Although the normality of residuals is considerably improved with the use of the
Cochrane-Orcutt approach, we can still expect some tendency for non-normality due to the
extreme disturbances caused by the financial crisis of 1998.
19
Both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics indicate the presence of at least one
cointegrating vector even when the correction term (N-vp)/N (where N is the number of
observations, v is the number of variables in the VAR system, and p is the order of the VAR
system) for small samples is applied (Reinsel and Ahn, 1992), thus the significance of the
first strongest cointegrating vector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue is confirmed.
20
Both periods 1967 to 1992 and 1967 to 2003 were examined.
21
OLS and Cochrane-Orcutt estimations on these pairs of relationships reconfirmed the
integrated market of the five ASEAN nations examined here.
22
Philippines is the only country that does not exhibit this strong relationship as much as the
other countries (for Philippines the coefficient of dum7 is significant only at the 10 per cent
significance level).
23
Hence Thailand’s GDP is less affected by the integration intervention policies than the
other countries, since for the latter the dummy value doubles in each period but not so for
Thailand. This might be due to the Asian financial crisis affecting this country more severely
than the other countries.

